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Petitioner, Rita C. Gum, acting as her own counsel, pro se, and
pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 49, submit the following
petition for w r i t of certiorari.
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.
Is this Decree of Divorce, given the Petitioner, invalid because the
trial court judge disregarded the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and should
i t be declared null and void by this Court?
ORDERS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This case was f i r s t appealed to The Utah Court of Appeals, on
October 4, 1990, from a final Decree of Divorce of the Third Judicial
District Court entered on September 10, 1990. Case No. 900528-CA.
Before Judges Orme, Greenwood, and Russon (Rule 31 Hearing).
The Court remanded the case for reconsideration:
"However, the record contains insufficient evidence to
support the court's finding * 1 7 regarding costs and fees and
the court's finding regarding defendant's pension. See Bhggs v.
Holcomb. 740 P.2d 2 8 1 , 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Birch v.
Birch. 771 P.2d 1114, 1116-17 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Accordingly, we remand for reconsideration of those
issues. If, having decided those issues, the court determines
some adjustment to other aspects of the property distribution
is in order, the court has the discretion to make such
adjustments."
The case was again appealed to The Utah Court of Appeals and on
June 2 1 , 1993 the Court ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
ORDER DENVING PETITION FOR REHEARING was Dated July 20. 1993.
JURIDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Court of Appeals entered i t s decision on June 2 1 , 1993.

There was a petition for rehearing filed on July 7, 1993. An Order
Denying Petition for Rehearing was dated July 20, 1993. A request for an
extension of time to petition for certiorari was filed August 13, 1993 and
an Order of extension of time was given up to and including September 18,
1993, dated August 13, 1993. This Court has jurisdiction to review the
Court of Appeals decision by writ of certiorari under Utah Code Annotated
§ 78-2-2(2), (3) (a) and (5), and Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule
45(a), (c). (Amended effective October 1, 1992.
CONTROLLING LAW
The Amended Decree of Divorce as determined by the Trial Court was
clearly erroneous.
Any certificate of readiness for trial which is served
upon the opposing party and filed with the clerk of the court in
which discovery is not complete prior to filing the certificate
or in which discovery is not complete prior to pretrial
conference may be stricken and the trial date, if assigned, may
be vacated. Rule 4-104 (5). Code of Judicial Administration.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990.)
Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is very clear in the matter
of disqualification of a judge:
"Whenever a party to any action or proceedings, civil or
criminal, or his attorney shall make and file an affidavit that
the judge before whom such action or proceedings is to be
tried or heard has a bias or prejudice, either against such
party or his attorney or in favor of any opposite party to the
suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, except to call
in another judge to hear and determine the matter. If the judge
against whom the affidavit is directed questions the
sufficiency of the affidavit, he shall enter an order directing
that a copy thereof be forthwith certified to another judge
(naming him) of the same court or of a court of like
jurisdiction, which judge shall then pass upon the legal
sufficiency of the affidavit [Emphasis added].
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Judge John A. Rokich did proceed further therein, before calling
in another judge to hear and determine the matter:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings and
Disposition in the Lower Courts
The record in this case is voluminous due in large part to the fact

that the Petitioner did not have funds to move from her home on H Street,
within 10 days, as the Court Ordered her to do. Substantial portions of the
record deal with this issue and no provisions of funds were made available
to help her move.
At the conclusion of what appears to be a very unorthodox and
disjointed t r i a l proceeding, the t r i a l court allowed the Defendant and
Respondent's attorney. Glen M. Richman, to prepare the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, as Attorneys for Plaintiff which alone should
make the divorce invalid (p. 189 - Record on Appeal).
On October 4, 1990, Rita filed a Notice of Appeal (p. 207 Record on Appeal). No Cross-Appeal was filed.
The Utah Court of Appeals remanded the case for reconsideration.
In the second trial the Trial Court improperly forced the Petitioner
to court to set a hearing before her Discovery was answered or her
Affidavit of Prejudice was ruled upon.
The Petitioner did not appear at this hearing as she felt that the
Court had no right in law to set it. The Trial Court proceeded w i t h a
hearing without the Petitioner present. The Court completely ignored the
remand of The Utah Court of Appeals.
The Court then ordered the Attorney for the Respondent to prepare a
new Findings of Facts and Decree of Divorce.
3

The second appeal was from this final Decree of Divorce of the Third
Judicial District Court entered on September 14, 1992.
B.

Statement of Facts
Petitioner, Rita C. Gum, and Respondent, James Richard Gum, were

married in March 1982. Their state of matrimony has continued for over
ten (10) years.
Factual statements are well covered in the two Briefs of Appellant
and the two Reply Briefs of Appellant in two appeals and the petition for a
rehearing, which she has filed in this case.
Petitioner from the time she took charge of the case when her last
attorney, Mr. Spafford, withdrew has tried to get the Honorable John A.
Rokich to follow the Utah Code of Civil Procedure and receive her due
process of law. Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Section 7. It is difficult
for the Petitioner to understand the prejudiced position of Judge Rokich
even to the point of not abiding the law in a divorce case. She has pointed
out these errors in her filings with the court and in person, but they
remain uncorrected. To do so would serve justice as it should be. Why did
the judge disobey the law in this case? Prejudice implies a preformed
judgment even more unreasoning than bias, and usually implies more
unreasoning than bias, and usually implies an unfavorable opinion.
At the original trial the Honorable John A. Rokich made many biased
and prejudiced statements to this Petitioner which she brought to issue,
in her Briefs before the Utah Court of Appeals as shown in and off the
record. This bias was unjust and resulted in actions that constituted a
clear abuse of discretion and that he is so deeply prejudiced she could not
have a fair or impartial hearing or trial before him. This was the main
reason for the appeals; the Court not abiding the law.
4

Upon remand of the case to the District Court by the Utah Court of
Appeals, the Petitioner filed an Affidavit of Prejudice. There were
months of delay while Judge Rokich did not act upon this Affidavit.
The trial could not legally proceed until this matter was resolved,
as required under Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
While waiting on this matter, the Petitioner filed REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS on June 10, 1991. The case could not be ready
for trial until the discovery was completed.
The Respondent filed CERTIFICATION OF READINESS FOR TRIAL in
September, 1991, stating,"... that opposing counsel have had reasonable
time to pursue discovery; and that all discovery of record has been
completed." The Discovery for the Petitioner was never completed by the
Respondent. The counsel for the Respondent was also delaying the case.
The Respondent filed OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS, OCTOBER 17, 1991. Which was never acted upon by the judge.
There were now two legal reasons why they could not proceed with a
trial. But the Court did proceed— illegally.
The record shows that this matter was referred by the assigned
judge under Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to the presiding
judge, Dec. 03, 1991.
Judge Murphy's Order:
...."that the matter is referred back to the assigned judge for
resolution."
This Order has still not been complied with. Therefore the
proceedings have never been completed— legally.
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ARGUMENT
I.
CAN THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE LEGALLV PROCEED
WHILE DISREGARDING THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDERE
From the time that the Petitioner took control of her case, Pro se,
after her attorney, Mr. Spafford, withdraw, she has devoted a large portion
of the time contending with the Honorable John A. Rokich about his duty to
abide w i t h the Utah Code of Civil Procedure. Very l i t t l e time was taken,
by the Court, covering the issues of the matters.
The P l a i n t i f f s discovery was never is not completed.
The Respondent filed a belated OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS on Oct. 17, 1991. (Record 290):
Defendant, through counsel, Glen M. Richardson, objects
to the Request for Production of Documents submitted by
Plaintiff. Under the status of the matter, further discovery is
not required and is not appropriate.
Petitioner had filed REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, June
10, 1991. Four months earlier. (Record 269)
Further discovery was necessary and required for the
Petitioner's case to proceed properly and to find what other property the
Respondent might be hiding from her.
Any certificate of readiness for t r i a l which is served
upon the opposing party and filed with the clerk of the court in
which discovery is not complete prior to f i l i n g the certificate
or in which discovery is not complete prior to pretrial
conference may be stricken and the trial date, if assigned, may
be vacated. Rule 4-104 (5). Code of Judicial Administration.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990.)
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This is one of the reasons the Petitioner did not appear at the
November 1, 1993 evidentiary hearing which can be found to be clearly
erroneous, and should be vacated by this Court. She also believed that she
would not receive a fair trial before Judge Rokich; the Record of that
hearing proves she was right in her belief.
The trial could not legally proceed until after the Presiding Judge
had held a hearing on the issue of judicial bias. Petitioner's claims
of judicial bias were not properly and appropriately determined
before the evidentiary hearing as required under Rule 63(b), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. (Brief of Appellant, A-3.)
Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is very clear in the
matter of disqualification of a judge:
"Whenever a party to any action or proceedings, civil or
criminal, or his attorney shall make and file an affidavit that
the judge before whom such action or proceedings is to be
tried or heard has a bias or prejudice, either against such
party or his attorney or in favor of any opposite party to the
suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, except to call
in another judge to hear and determine the matter. If the judge
against whom the affidavit is directed questions the
sufficiency of the affidavit, he shall enter an order directing
that a copy thereof be forthwith certified to another judge
(naming him) of the same court or of a court of like
jurisdiction, which judge shall then pass upon the legal
sufficiency of the affidavit [Emphasis added].
Judge John A. Rokich did proceed further therein, before calling in
another judge to hear and determine the matter.
TRANSCRIPT:
The Court: And probably before you put on the testimony
I think it would be better if we locate the file and put it in the
record and you can come in some other time and take some
testimony..
7

Mr. Richman: Can we preserve the testimony today?
The Court: Fine. That's Fine. You may.
Mr. Richman: I would like to also put on the record what
happened. (Transcript p. 11, line 7 to 15).
The f i l e could not be located because there was none from Judge
Murphy.
The November 1, 1993 evidentiary hearing can be found to be clearly
erroneous, and this was one reason why Petitioner did not appear. She
also believed that she would not receive a fair t r i a l before Judge Rokich;
the Record of this hearing proves she was right in her belief.
WHAT CONSTITUTES JUDICIAL BIAS
II.
The f i r s t error in law the Honorable John A. Rokich made was a
biased and prejudiced Order for the Petitioner to move from her home in
ten days, against her and the children's rights under Section 1, 14th
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The Petitioner has found no law whereby a judge can legally issue
such an Order. The Court gave no consideration to the circumstances of
the Petitioner and the minor children; with the Respondent taking control
of the bank accounts he had left the family destitute.
TRANSCRIPT:
Salt Lake City, Utah; Wednesday, July 11, 1990 (3:00 P.M.)
The Court: Let's find out why she doesn't move out, not
where she's going to go. [Emphasis added].
Q.

(By Mr. Spafford)
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Why haven't you moved out?

A.
I don't have anyplace to go. I don't have any money
to go anyplace. (Tr. p. 20, lines 2 -13 &. A-52). [Emphasis
added].
The Court: We're going to waste a lot of time here. I can
sort it out. I told you in the first instance I'm inclined to have
her move out of the house: They haven't shown me any reason
why she shouldn't be out. So, I'm not convinced that the fact
that she hasn't any place to go is any reason that I should not
enforce the order. So, you know— (Tr. p. 25, lines 16-22&.
A-54). [Emphasis added].
Had the court not prejudged and decided the issue before hearing the
testimony, and was not willing to take the time to hear the testimony or
weigh the circumstances as to what was fair and just?
In a similar case, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
We offer the general philosophy expressed in Haslam v.
Morrison. 1 13 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520. 523 (1948) Justice
Wolfe, writing for the court, stated: The purity and integrity
of the judicial process ought to be protected against any taint
of suspicion to the end that the public and litigants may have
the highest confidence in the integrity and fairness of the
courts.' Justice Wade in a concurring opinion stressed this
point when he wrote: 'One of the most important things in
government is that all persons subject to its jurisdiction shall
always be able to maintain a fair and impartial trial in all
matters of litigation in the courts. It is nearly as important
that the people have absolute confidence in the integrity of the
courts. I can think of nothing that would as surely bring the
courts into disrepute as for a judge to insist on trying a case
when one of the litigants believes that such judge is biased
and prejudiced against him'." Merchant v. Merchant 743 P.2d
199 (Utah App. 1987),
The Court ordered Petitioner to move in the unreasonable time of ten
days and finally presented an unfair dilemma to the Petitioner, "either
move or else

"
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The Petitioner had offered to move if the Respondent gave her
$3,000 to move with. This was not done, and was later determined, by the
Court, along with some of the furniture, to be a stipulation of settlement.
The Respondent had offered an interest in their thrift plan but the
Honorable John A. Rokich said in camera, of the $3,000, "That is all you're
going to get."
Although the Respondent had agreed that any money additions
accrued to his retirement during the marriage of the parties should be
divided equally between the parties (p. 123, par. 9 - Record on Appeal).
The Petitioner sold the home on H Street, of which the parties were
joint tenants, for One Hundred and Eighteen Thousand Dollars ($118.000).
She had two appraisals of over Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000)
each. But, with pressure from the Court she could not wait longer for the
right buyer. The potential loss was over Eighty Thousand Dollars
($80,000).
Nothing was said about selling another home, at 5685 South 3650
West, Bennion, where James was living on his U.P Corporation Pension
Plan retirement of Three Thousand Ninety Five Dollars and 72 Cents
($3,095.72) per month. This home is still owned by both parties as joint
tenants. And issue that still needs settlement.

DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERROR REGARDING THE CONDUCT OF
THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE
III.
When Rita was unable to leave their home, as she had no money to
make the move, Mr. Spafford withdraw from her case.
In a letter to Rita, dated July 19, 1990, he stated:
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"I cannot endorse your decision to defy the Court
Order, This alone is a basis for Withdrawal."
The Petitioner's Attorney, Mr. Spafford, should have appealed this
illegal Order at that point, and protected his client instead of
withdrawing. The appeal at this time could have saved his client much
time, money and heartache.
From this point on, the Court and the Attorney for the Respondent
committed illegal acts which caused the proceedings to be illegal.
It is the illegal acts which are addressed in these arguments as a
question of law.
DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT
OF THE TRIAL COURT
IV.
Petitioner feels that this Court has misconstrued or overlooked
statutes and decisions which have affected the result, or that they have
based the decision on some wrong principle of the law, or have either
misapplied or overlooked something which materially affects the result.
The Amended Decree of Divorce as determination by the Trial Court
was clearly erroneous.
THIS PETITION IS NOT FRIVOLOUS AND WITHOUT MERIT AS
THE PETITIONER AND THE CHILDREN HAVE BEEN

DEPRIVED QF THOUSANDS QF DOLLARS THAT IS LEGALLY
THEIRS
V.
This appeal is not frivolous and without merit.
The Petitioner and the children have been deprived of thousands of
dollars worth of property that is legally theirs.
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If the parties had settled all disputed issues properly and fairly
according to the laws of Utah, as they should have been, then there would
have been no appeal of the verdict.
There are many matters that should have been properly and legally
tried and resolved in the Trial Court.
ALIMONV:
In making an award of alimony, trial courts in Utah are
duty bound to consider the financial condition and needs of the
spouse requesting alimony, the ability of that spouse to
produce sufficient income for herself or himself and the
ability of the paying spouse to provide support to the
requesting spouse. (Olson v. Olson. 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985);
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer. 745 P.2d 276 (Utah 1987); Jones v.
Jones. 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985); Canning v. Canning. 744 P.2d
325 (Utah App. 1987); and Schindlerv. Schindler. 776 P.2d 84
(Utah App. 1989).
As was stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Olson v. Olson. 704
P.2d 564 (Utah 1985):
An alimony award should, as far as possible, equalize the
parties' respective standards of living and maintain them at a
level as close as possible to the standard of living enjoyed
during the marriage.
CHILDREN:
Divorce courts are deemed to have broad equitable powers in
safeguarding the interests and welfare of children and the
decree and orders in a divorce proceeding are of a different and
higher character than judgments in an action of law. Barrett v.
Barrett 403 P.2d 649, 17 Utah 2d 1. (Utah 1965).
PROPERTY:
In a Washington case Lynn v. Lynn 480 P.2d 789, 4 Wash.App.
171 (Wash.App. 1971) the court stated:
12

Although trial court is not in a divorce proceeding
required to award all separate property to the party acquiring
it or to divide community property equally, the court does not
have unfetted freedom to exercise its personal judgment.
RCWA 26.08-110.
Both homes of the parties were held in joint tenancy. In the Arizona
case of Nesmith v. Nesmith 540 P.2d 1229, 112 Ariz. 248 (Ariz. 1975).

it

is stated:
Joint tenancy property is to be divided equally by trial
court in divorce. A.R.S. § 25-318.
ATTORNEY FEES:
This Court in the recent case of Rasband v. Rasband. 752
P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988) found that under the Utah Code
Annotated Section 30-3-3 that on remand the Trial Court
should also determine the Appellant's need for Respondent's
payment of her attorney's fees incurred in the appeal and that
if a financial need were adequately shown that the Trial Court
could take evidence regarding a reasonable fee in making such
an order pursuant to that statute.
PENSION:
A pension being considered as marital property
(Woodward v. Woodward. 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), a portion
of Respondent's monthly pension benefits should be considered
as an entitlement of Appellant.
The Utah Supreme Court in the oft cited case of Woodward v.
Woodward. 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), specifically held, citing an earlier
case of Enqlert v. Englert. 576 P.2d 1247 (Utah 1978) as follows:
. . . We emphasize the equitable nature of proceedings dealing
with the family, pointing out that the court may take into
consideration all of the pertinent circumstances. These
circumstances encompass "all of the assets of every nature
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from
whatever source derived; and that this includes any such
13

pension fund or Insurance", i d , at 1276. To the extent that
Bennett v. Bennett, supra, may l i m i t the ability of the court to
consider all of the parties' assets and circumstances,
including retirement and pension rights, i t is expressly
overruled.
SHOULD NOT THIS CASE HAVE BEEN AGAIN REMANDED TO
TRIAL COURT WHERE IT COULD HAVE BEEN PROPERLV AND
LEGALLY TRIED AND RESOLVED BEFORE A FAIR JUDGE
VI.
In the f i r s t Appeal, the Court remanded the case for reconsideration:
"However, the record contains insufficient evidence to
support the court's finding * 1 7 regarding costs and fees and
the court's finding regarding defendant's pension. See Briggs v.
Holcomb. 740 P.2d 2 8 1 , 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Birch v.
Birch. 771 P.2d 1114, 1116-17 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Accordingly, we remand for reconsideration of those
issues. If, having decided those issues, the court determines
some adjustment to other aspects of the property distribution
is in order, the court has the discretion to make such
adjustments."
Is not the above the least consideration the Petitioner should
receive?
CONCLUSION
Because the Honorable John A. Rokich did not abide by the law as
required under Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4-104
(5). Code of Judicial Administration. (Amended effective January 15,
1990.), or follow the Order of the the Court of Appeals, Petitioner did not
receive her due process of law as protected by the Constitution of Utah
Article 1, Section 7.
Petitioner also feels that in the second appeal the Court of Appeals
misconstrued or overlooked the above statutes and other decisions which
14

have affected the result, or that they have based the decision on some
wrong principle of the law, or have either misapplied or overlooked
something which materially affects the result. Should not the Decree of
Divorce have been declared null and void by the Court of Appeals?
The Petitioner was entitled to due process of law and a fair trial as
described in 88 C.J.S. 36, 91, 92 and 93.
A new trial should be based at the very least on the May 23, 1991
Order in the Utah Court of Appeals; which was not properly considered by
the Trial Court.
The Petitioner respectfully prays that because the Court of Appeals'
decision on a proper Decree of Divorce incorrectly decided an important
question of state law, establishes bad public policy and conflicts with
controlling Utah statutes and prior decisions of this Court, this Court
should grant the Petitioner's petition for a writ of certiorari to review
that decision.
DATED this 12.

day of September, 1993.

TYsJ^t/ L. > ^ W ^
Rita C. Gum, Pro Se
Attorney for Petitioner

(Original signature)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the above and
foregoing petition for Writ of Certiorari were served upon the
Defendant/Respondent by hand-delivering same to the following counsel of
iry

record on this U.

-C0V

day of September, 1993:

GLEN rt. RICHMAN, ESQ. (2752)
RICHMAN & RICHMAN
Attorney for Defendant - Respondent
60 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801)532-8844

Rita C. Gum

(Original signature)
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ary T. Noonan
Clerk of thf Court
Utah Court of Appeals

ooOoo
Rita C. Gum,
ORDER

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
James Richard Gum,

Case No. 900528-CA

Defendant and Appellee.

Before Judges Orme, Greenwood, and Russon (Rule 31 Hearing).
Based on the evidence in the record and, in particular,
plaintiffs concessions as set forth in the document she filed
with the court styled by her a supplemental complaint, we
affirm the trial court's findings and conclusions regarding
alimony, child support, the grounds for granting the divorce,
and the real property and sale proceeds.
However, the record contains insufficient evidence to
support the court's finding #17 regarding costs and fees and
the court's finding regarding defendant's pension. See Brioas
v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Birch v.
Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1116-17 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Accordingly, we remand for reconsideration of those issues.
If, having decided those issues, the court determines some
adjustment to other aspects of the property distribution is in
order, the court has the discretion to make such adjustments.
Dated this 23rd day of May, 1991.
ALL CONCUR:

Gregory^. Orme, Judge

7~

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 23rd day of May, 1991, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand-delivered or
deposited in the United States mail.
Rita C. Gum
1034 East 900 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84105

Glen M. Richman
Attorney at Law
60 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Craig E. Ludwig
Clerk of the Court
Salt Lake Third District Court
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Honorable John A, Rokich
Third District Court Judge
240 East 400 South, Room 401
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
Dated this 23rd day of May, 1991.

Deoutv /Clerk

UtahC^ ......-*DDeais

JUN 2 1 19S3
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
pr •

00O00

« <"• r-'oonan
'- *••. J: V.'O Court

Rita C. Gum r
ORDER
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 920164-CA
v.
James Richard Gum,
Defendant and Appellee.

Before Judges Jackson, Greenwood, and Orme (Rule 3 1 ) .
This matter is before the court pursuant to Rule 31, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

,}
Dated this

—

^

^j

day of June, 1993.

^

N6rman H. Ja^fcfson,

Judge

Pamela T. G r e e n w o o d ^ J u d g e

G r e g o r y K^Ofme,
/

Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 21st day of Junef 1993f a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United
States mail to the parties listed below:
Rita C. Gum
1034 East 900 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
Glen M. Richman
Richman & Richman
Attorneys at Law
60 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Salt Lake Third District Court
Attn: Alice Wong
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
The Honorable John A. Rokich
Third District Court Judge
240 East 400 South, Room 401
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
Dated this 21st day of June, 1993.

By<?Jtiii,i

]

kii\[\k>

Deputy// C l e r k

Trial Ct. No. D90-4901065

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

JUL 2 0 1993
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00-'

Rita C. Gum,

J'
1

MaryT. Noonan
Clerk of the Court

ORDER DENYING
PETITION FOR REHEARING

Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 920164-CA

v.
James Richard Gum,
Defendant and Aaoellee.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon appellant's
Petition for Rehearing, filed July 7, 1993,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appellant's Petition for
Rehearing is denied.

Dated this 20th day of July, 1993.
FOR THE COURT:

yX&y,wn

'rf^t-l .
Mary T./Noonan
Clerk \/f the Court

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of July, 1993, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING
was deposited in the United States mail to the parties listed
below:
Rita C. Gum
1034 East 900 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
Glen M. RicbTnan

Richman & Richman
Attorneys at Law
60 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Dated this 20th day of July, 1993.

By *Skl<
rf/U///Jh
Deputy C l e t k

FILED
m t 5 1993
case Name:

RITA C

GUM v

'

' '

JAMES RICHARD GUM

»

q FRK SUPREME COURT
UTAH

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that an extension of time be given to
the petitioner,

Rita C. Gum

,

for the

preparation and filing of petition for a writ of certiorari up to and
including

September 18, 1993

DATED this

13th

.

day of

August

, 1993.

BY THE COURT:

^JjrfZL Q. *•
JUSTICE

